A secure calculation of common data (D 1 ∩. . .∩D n ) of different participants without disclosing D i is useful for many applications and has been studied as the Secure Multiparty Computation problem. However, proposed solutions assume all participants act "semi-honest", which means participants may neither alter the protocol execution nor fake database content. In this contribution, we focus on malicious participant behavior and prove that an atomic exchange of common data is not possible under the assumption of malicious participants. We propose a mechanism to calculate the intersection of multiple participants, which does not only reduce the disclosure in case participants cheat by altering the protocol to a negligible amount, it is also resistant against malicious participants that cooperate in order to cheat others. Furthermore, it impedes database content faking, which could be done when using other protocols by participants in order to check if data is contained in the other's databases. Last, we show experimentally the practical usability of our protocol and how the level of trust has an impact on the exchange speed of the intersection.
INTRODUCTION
Companies that store their enterprise information within a database often consider these information confidential. But there are also situations, in which n companies want to know if they have common data, and which data this is. However, the parties are not willing to disclose any other data than the intersection. The problem of securely computing the data all parties have in common is called the sovereign information sharing problem.
In this contribution, we address the problem of computing the intersection of multiple parties without trusting a third party, when one or more participants may act malicious. This means, we address the problem that participants may get an advantage by changing the exchange protocol in such a way, that the party that receives and fully decrypts the common data first can suppress the sending of the corresponding information that is necessary for the other party.
Whenever enterprises have need for an exchange of common data, but do not want to reveal other information, these data is often stored within database tables, say within database tables D 1 to D n of the companies N 1 to N n . A protocol is needed that returns the intersection (D 1 ∩ . . . ∩ D n ), but does not reveal any other information; it even should not disclose size information like |D i |.
For example, let us look at an enterprise N 1 and its rivals N 2 and N 3 , which do business in the service industry. All enterprises want to know whether all three have common customers in order to check whether these customers play the companies off against each other. Another use would be to detect customers of all three companies in order to start special marketing actions on these customers.
For this reason, N 1 , N 2 , and N 3 want to examine their customer databases for addresses of customers that are common to all three parties. However, no party is willing to disclose information about customers that the other parties do not have, and they do not want to disclose information about their number of customers, i.e. about the sizes |D i |.
Existing approaches and proposals that also address the sovereign information sharing problem (Naor and Pinkas, 1999; Huberman et al., 1999; Freedman et al., ; Kissner and Song, ) focus on solutions for two participants and either disclose the intersection to a single party only, or they assume an "honest-but-curious" behavior for all participants, which means they will follow the protocol strictly and send -as the protocol's last step -the information that the other parties needs to calculate the intersection. However, there might be situations in which participants that learned of the intersection suppresses the sending of information that is required for the other participants to decrypt the intersection information as well.
In addition, (Naor and Pinkas, 1999; Huberman et al., 1999) require that the database sizes |D i | are revealed. However, a sharing of size information may be not acceptable for companies, e.g. if |D i | represents the number of a company's customers.
There are business settings in which the partners do not want to rely on a trusted third party that performs a significant part of an intersection computation for a variety of reasons, e.g. a trusted third party may be too difficult or too time-consuming to find, it may be too expensive or simply not wanted for political reasons. Therefore, we do not assume to have a trusted third party and focus on the problem that each participant may stop the protocol execution whenever there is an advantage for him. In the following, we prove that when no trustworthy third party is available, an atomic exchange of common data is not possible if some participants may cheat in terms of altering the protocol. Second, we provide a mechanism that allows participants to exchange a bunch of information units like customer data or supplier information without having the risk of being cheated by more than one information unit.
Unfortunately, when data faking is considered as a possibility, participants could invent a lot of customer data in order to get the complete customer data set of another party as intersection. The only possibility to achieve that stored data complies with reality, i.e., to prevent participants from faking data, is a third-party auditing device that punishes participants for cheating (Agrawal and Terzi, 2006) . Contrary to this approach, we present a mechanism appropriate especially for practical applications that makes it extremely hard to create faked data that will not be identified as such. Our approach bases on unique information, which is visible only to the real owners of the data item.
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
Besides the requirement to disclose only the intersection, we also need to guarantee that no party can cheat within the disclosing process. An attacker that has the goal to learn data from other participants that the attacker does not own by itself can use different techniques to achieve its goal: the attacker can inspect, manipulate, invent, or suppress messages; the attacker can manipulate the protocol, i.e. stop the protocol execution at any time or wrongly encrypt/decrypt messages, and the attacker can fake data, i.e. the attacker can invent data in order to learn whether other participants own this data. Our protocol does not assume a failure-free network, and distinguishes between message loss and active message suppression. Thus, we assume that each participant acknowledges the received messages and a sender repeats the sending of non-acknowledged messages until the network will finally deliver the message.
We cannot guarantee that each party N i provides all its data for the computation of the intersection (D 1 ∩ . . . ∩ D n ). Therefore, we assume that each participant contributes only that data to the intersection computation, which it accepts to disclose if it is in the intersection. Furthermore, we assume that participants agree on a common data format used for the data in the intersection computation.
An additional requirement is, that size information |D j | should not be disclosed to any other party.
Protocols that disclose (D 1 ∩ . . . ∩ D n ) only to one party (e.g. (Agrawal et al., 2003) ) are not suitable since we cannot guarantee that the other parties will also receive the intersection. Therefore, we need a protocol that guarantees atomicity for the exchange of
Unfortunately, we can prove in Section 3.1 that a complete atomic exchange of (D 1 ∩ . . . ∩ D n ) cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, we need a protocol that at least reduces the suffered damage in the case that a company cheats.
SOLUTION
We first prove that an atomic exchange of the common data is not possible if participants may cheat in terms of message suppression.
Impossibility of Multiparty Atomic Data Exchange
Our proof that the atomic exchange of common data is not possible is based on a proof idea of the two generals' problem (Gray, 1978) , where two generals want to agree on an attack time by using an uncertain medium. We will expand the proof to an information exchange among n participants.
Definition 3.1 Let N 1 to N n be the owners of the data D 1 to D n . A sovereign information sharing protocol IP is said to be multiparty intersection safe, if it fulfills the following two conditions: 
Then, there also exists a minimal protocol, i.e. a protocol that does not contain any superfluous message, to let all parties learn (D 1 ∩. . .∩D n ). A minimal protocol is either the original protocol, or an equivalent protocol in which all superfluous messages are left out. To let the protocol compute and deliver the intersection, each participant N i must send at least one message and must receive at least one message.
Because each successfully delivered message is received after it has been sent, each minimal protocol must contain also at least one last message M last , i.e. a message which is sent by a participant N j and received by a participant N i after N i has sent its last message. Since the protocol is minimal, M last is needed by N i to learn (D 1 ∩ . . . ∩ D n ). Furthermore, since the protocol delivers (D 1 ∩ . . . ∩ D n ) to all partners, it has used the information provided by N i to compute (D 1 ∩ . . . ∩ D n ), i.e. N i has sent the information that is necessary to completely disclose the intersection (D 1 ∩ . . . ∩ D n ), before N i has received M last . Therefore, N j could suppress sending M last without preventing N i from sending its information that is necessary to completely disclose the intersection (D 1 ∩. . .∩D n ). Therefore, N i had no guarantee to learn about the intersection (D 1 ∩ . . . ∩ D n ) , i.e., this behavior of N i is a contradiction to the assumption that all participants act distrustful.
The conclusion of this proof is that all but one parties must take the risk of being cheated and being the first who sends the information which is necessary to disclose (D 1 ∩ . . . ∩ D n ). Otherwise, there would be no exchange, since at least one party must be the last who sends a message M last that completely discloses information of (D 1 ∩ . . . ∩ D n ).
However, although atomicity for the complete intersection is not possible, we can reduce the damage that the one-sided disclosure of the common data involves by an approach outlined in Section 3.4. The idea is to reveal only a small part of the intersection
, and let the next party send the next part in return. Since our proposed algorithm is able to detect faked data, the cheating of a party will uncover only a small part of the intersection, which in many cases reduces the damage.
However, as we can see in the next section, we cannot make the disclosed information parts, which we call information units, arbitrary small. The part of the intersection that we want to disclose during one protocol exchange step in the second half of our protocol corresponds to one information unit. Note that information units are only considered for exchange purposes, and not for the calculation of D u , which is based on tuples and not on information units.
Information Units Definition 3.4 Let
Definition 3.5 Given the set ds = {d 1 , . . . , d k } of information units, we call d j ∈ ds independent if the following holds.
If 
Note that an independent information unit may contain more than one customer, but an independent information unit cannot be made arbitrarily small. The next example, which focuses on security but not on efficiency, shows this property. and d l+2 will disclose "d" and "a". Therefore, if we use characters as information units, the information units used during the exchange process are not independent.
For this reason, if non-independent information units are used, a party can sometimes conclude more than one information unit while the other party may not necessarily know which data is meant. Therefore, if e.g. D i knows which data is in the intersection and cheats by stopping the exchange of non-independent information units, another party D j may have no chance to conclude any missing information unit.
When exchanging only independent information units, we can reduce the advantage that a cheating party may get by altering the protocol to one independent information unit (c.f. Section 3.4.3).
Cryptographic Basis
Our solution is based on commutative encryption, which means that given two cryptographic encryption keys key N i used by N i and key N j used by N j , the encryption order of applying an encryption function E is commutative:
Since the order of applying the encryption functions E key N i and E key N j and the corresponding decryption functions does not matter, we call this commutative encryption.
Cryptographic functions and their implementation have already been discussed in various cryptographic publications (Diffie and Hellman, 1976; Gamal, 1985) . Therefore, we assume that secure algorithms are used, such that keys cannot be broken even if plain and ciphered text are known.
Exchange Algorithm
Given n participants, our algorithm is applied cyclically to each participant. To explain the calculations of each participant, we start labeling the first participant with N 1 and the last one with N n , where the participant's indices form a ring, i.e. the successor of n is 1. We use the bracket notation [X] as a shortcut for ((X − 1) mod n) + 1. Example 3.10 For n = 7 participants, the notion C 3 P 6 means that each hash value of P 6 is first encrypted by N 6 , the resulting tuples are then encrypted by N 7 , and finally encrypted by N 1 .
The general idea of our algorithm can be summarized within three steps.
Initialization Phase
In this first phase, all participants agree on the data field(s) that they want to check for common data. In order to hide the real size information |D i |, they agree on a common database size sz to be exchanged. sz should be chosen in such a way that sz > max (|D 1 |, . . . |D n |) . After this, each party N i adds randomly created data to their database D i until
Afterwards, each participant hashes each of its own data tuples n times with the same hash algorithm, such that each participant N i has computed P i := P n i and has stored all of its computed intermediate hash results P j i for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The hashing of values n times is used later in the Verification Phase in such a way that each of the participants has to contribute one preimage of a hashed value as a proof of ownership. and passes them to N [i+2] , who also encrypts them etc., until each data tuple is encrypted n times by n different participants. These n times encrypted data tuples C n P j are exchanged, such that each participant stores the set {C n P j | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}. The exchange phase is illustrated in Figure 1 , where N 1 starts encrypting its hashed data P 1 , and passing it to N 2 . After one cycle, N 1 gets SECRYPT 2007 -International Conference on Security and Cryptography back its hashed data n times encrypted as C n P 1 from N n . This data is cyclically sent to all other participants, i.e. N 2 , . . . , N n 1 . Due to commutative encryption, the intersection of the encrypted data C n
Intersection Exchange Phase
represents the intersection of the original data P 1 ∩ P 2 ∩ . . . ∩ P n .
Algorithm 1 Intersection Exchange Algorithm for
5:
6: end for
← D act ⊲ Store the fully encrypted data 8: for j := 1 to n − 1 do 9:
10:
11:
12: end for Algorithm 1 shows the multiple encryption steps of a participant's data. First, each participant N i encrypts each of its own tuples P i with its own key (line 1). Then, this encrypted data is sent to the next participant N [i+1] , and the data from the previous participant N [i−1] is received (lines 3-4). Since each participant's data has to be encrypted by every participant, N i encrypts the all data with its own key and shuffles the resulting tuples (line 5). In the next iteration of the for loop (line 2-6), this data is again sent to N [i+1] . After n iterations, D act contains the data of participant N [i+1] , which was n times encrypted, i.e. C n P [i+1] (line 7).
When all participants have exchanged the encrypted data, each participant has stored the same encrypted data after the execution of the second for-loop (lines 8-12). Table 1 shows an example execution of the algorithm for n = 3. After the initial phase, each participant N i has its own encrypted data C 1 P i . In the next round, each participant sends its data to the next participant, which encrypts it with its key. After n − 1 rounds, each participant holds data that is encrypted n times. These data are exchanged in the following ex- 
after lines 2-7, j = 2 exchange phase (lines 8-11)
after lines 8-11, j = 2 change phase, until every participant is able to store all fully encrypted data.
Revealing and Verification Phase
In this phase, participants agree on an order for determining the intersecting information units. The first participant passes the first information unit to the next participant, which decrypts it with its key, and passes it to the next participant, which decrypts with its key, etc. Finally, the first participant will receive the initial information unit, which is only encrypted by itself. Therefore, the first participant can decrypt the information unit and learn the hash value. From the hash value, it can conclude the plain data.
In order to make sure that the participant who just learned the plain data was not betrayed 1 , it passes the hash value v to the next participant. Only if v is in the next participant's database, the next participant can conclude the plain data and can use the set of hashed data that was created in the Initialization Phase to look up the hash value v ′ that was hashed to v by applying h(v ′ ) = v. This means, each participant decodes the hashing that was applied n times in the Initialization Phase by one step.
After each participant has received all encrypted data C n P 1 . . .C n P n , it can detect the intersecting data tuples. We assume that all participants apply the same algorithm to agree on a labeling of intersecting tuples, on a coordinator that starts the revealing of data tuples for each round, and on the number of tuples per information unit.
The revealing and verification algorithm is described by Algorithm 2. Each participant N i starts by adding sequentially the amount of intersecting tuples that should be in a single information unit j (line 2). Then, participant N i decides if it is responsible for coordinating the round. If this is the case, is sends the first information unit 2 that is in the intersection of the 
⊲ if N i is coordinator, j is plain hash and the verification starts 10:
if coordinatesRound(N i , round) == true then 11:
12:
end if 13: information unit (line 6), decrypts it, and passes it to the next participant (lines 7-8). After all participants except N i decrypted the information unit, N i will receive it and decrypt it (line 6-7). After this decryption, j contains the decrypted, n times hashed value of a single data tuple from P j . This cyclic decryption is analogous to Algorithm 1. Then, N i is able to lookup the original text that was hashed to this value (line 11). However, it wants to make sure that no one cheated, therefore a second cyclic exchange phase is started. At this time, each participant that receives a hash value h is able to lookup the plain data (line 11). Furthermore, it can also lookup the hash value verify that was hashed to h, i.e. h := hash(verify) by using the deHash1Level(h) function. This means, the deHash1Level(h) function searches the intermediate hash results that each participant generated in the Initialisation Phase, i.e. P j i for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, to look up the hash value that was hashed to h. A detailed explanation why this step ensures security can be found in the following Section 3.5. The hash value verify is then passed to the next participant, which again deHashes one level. In the end, N i have to perform a last deHash1Level step and will then receive the plain data. This plain data is compared with the plain data that the coordinator has looked up before the verification phase (line 11) started. If this data is equal, no one cheated since all had the hash values and the data item stored within their database.
Correctness
The real database size information of a participant N i is hidden to all other participants, since in the Initialisation phase, N i adds a bunch of random data to its database until |D i | ≈ sz. Since the random data tuples will not find corresponding data within the intersection, the original database size of a participant is concealed.
Although each participants receives the encrypted data of all other participants, it does not know which of his tuples correspond to the received data tuples due to encryption. Furthermore, since each encryption step involves shuffling the encrypted data, a participant that receives the encryption of its own data tuples does not even know which of its own plain text tuples correspond to a concrete encrypted data tuple.
In addition, message manipulation can be detected in the verification phase: The coordinator, who is the first participant who reveals the hash values and thereby the plain data, demands from each participant N j a proof that N j stores the revealed data in its database. This proof is done by using one of the n hash values for each tuple: A participant N j that receives a hash value h can only lookup the value verify that was hashed to h if it owns the value verify. This means, the statement verify ← deHash1Level(h) (line 16) can only be evaluated if N j stores the data. If N j cheats, N [ j+1] will either not find the hash value it received from N j in its hash data for the actual hash level, or, if N j simply forwards h, the coordinator will detect in the last step that one participant cheated and the hash value does not map to the plain value, but to another hash value instead (line 19). Since each data tuple is hashed n times, each of the n participants must have the original data tuple and all of its hash values stored to let the last participant send the hash value of level 1 to the coordinator.
The verification phase also detects as follows whether in the decryption part someone cheated and exchanged data: Since any decrypted hash value h will only pass the cyclic verification if all participants own the data, h is either in the intersection, or it will not pass the last check of the coordinator, since in this case at least one participant does not have the necessary information for the deHash1Level(h) function. If this happens, the participant that is the first to detect the cheat will stop the protocol and not continue decrypting the units. Furthermore, the participant that cheated can be identified since it does not own the hash value, and therefore it is expelled from the protocol.
This means, altering the protocol by suppressing or manipulating messages may only prevent the par-ties from learning one information unit of the intersection, but does not disclose the complete set
A participant N i that is supposed to encrypt data tuples of another participant N j may delete some or all of these data. However, missing tuples will not occur in the intersection, and therefore these tuples will not be decrypted, so N j will not get any information about the data it deleted. Since N i agreed to bring in only those tuples that N i is willing to share in case all others have the same data, there is no incentive for N i to delete data in Algorithm 1, since it has the same effect as deleting data of its own data file in the Initialisation Phase, except that it does not even know which data will be excluded from the intersection.
Impeding Tuple Faking
Although cheating in terms of message suppression and manipulation can be detected by our algorithm and therefore the damage is reduced, one problem remains, which is faking database tuples. In our example, evil participants can add a huge amount of telephone book entries to their customer databases in order to abuse intersection computation to check which customers the other partners have. To impede this kind of faking, the parties must agree to additionally supply tuple-specific information that all parties have due to the real existence of the tuple in their database. This tuple-specific information should not be of such a kind that it can not be guessed or concluded from information that is available for public. An address field, for instance, is no tuple-specific information since it can be easily obtained from public resources.
Example 3.11 Credit card data, for example, is a tuple-specific information. If this data is faked, the generated credit card number belonging to the customer will extremely unlikely match with the real credit card number, i.e. the complete customer record will differ and thus both customer entries differ in their hash values. Other examples for tuple specific information are social security number, income tax number, student number, etc.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

Exchange Speed Versus Trust
The efficiency of our intersection computation algorithm depends on given parameters like the intersection size, the connection speed, and on a chooseable 
Experimental Setup
We have prototypically implemented our protocol, in order to get information about the exchange speed when we change the number of exchanged information units, i.e. the level of how much the participants trust each other. For generating the test set, we have extracted a part of the German telephone book that contains about 1,3 mill. entries (i.e. data from Berlin), having the size of about 200MB. Table 2 shows our measurements using SHA-1 as hash function on an AMD 64 3700+ with 2 GB RAM. After applying the hash function, the resulting file has the size of 37 MB. When applying the algorithm to n participants, the hashing and encryption times has to be multiplied with n, while the decryption is only applied to the information units of the intersection.
Since the exchange of the data is pure data exchange plus the time the encryption needs, we show in the following the results for the tuple exchange of the Revealing and Verification Phase and compare our algorithm for 2, 3, 5 and 7 participants exchanging 1, 2, 5, 10, 15 and 100 information units per message. In this test scenario, the participants are connected via a 100MBit network. In order to get information about low bandwidth connections as well, we measured the time for 2 participants, one of which is connected by "DSL light" that allows only 768kbit/s downstream and 128kbit/s upstream data transfer rates. The average ping rate for packets of size 1024 bytes between these two participants is 144ms. Figure 2 shows the time needed for the exchange and verification phase of 10,000 tuples within an 100MBit network. The indicated time on the y− axis is the time that is needed for passing the tuples two times cyclically to all participants in order to decrypt the information units and store the hash values to disc. However, we have omitted the time that is needed for the hash lookup, since this constant factor highly depends on the number of intersecting tuples, the implementation (e.g. the use of indices or databases) and the available main memory. In our experiments, we were able to load all hashed data into main memory, therefore the time for the hash lookup (which we did by using hash tables) of 10,000 data values was around 13 milli seconds. On the x− axis, the number n corresponds to the number of participants, while directly underneath each bar the number of tuples that are exchanged in one message is given, i.e. the number of tuples within one information unit. If we have more participants, the number of participants that must decrypt and dehash the data rises analogously. This explains the additional amount of time that is needed for 5 and 7 participants. However, this additional time rises linearly, since each additional participant increases the amount of additional exchange steps by a constant factor. Figure 3 shows the time which is needed for exchanging 1,000 tuples between two participants connected by a "DSL light" broadband connection. Since a LAN connection's response time is much superior to the DSL connection's response time, the exchange speed for the DSL connection is also much slower. However, the effect that a higher level of trust and an increased number of tuples bundled within one information unit have is much greater than in a LAN environment. To summarize, if participants do not trust each other very much and send only one tuple in advance, a fast connection highly pays-off, while for participants whose level of trust is higher and who therefore agree to send more tuples within an information unit, a fast connection is not an essential requirement. Due to the cyclic exchange, the number of (equivalently connected) participants has only linear impact on the exchange speed.
RELATED WORK
There are two aspects that have been studied widely within the sovereign information sharing scenario: the multiparty computation and the fair exchange of the data. The multiparty computation concentrates on the joint computation of f (D 1 , . . . , D n ) without revealing the actual data D i . Examples of functions f that are computed are cooperative scientific computations arising in linear programming (Du and Atallah, 2001) , or Yao's Millionaire's protocol (Yao, 1982) , in which f (a, b) returns the information of whether or not a > b.
Cryptographic approaches like (Freedman et al., ) also discuss the multiparty computation problem with f as the intersection function for two datasets D 1 and D 2 . However, these solutions guarantee that only one participant learns of the intersection, and not the other one. Therefore, the used malicious adversarial model for multi-party computation does not include the problem that one participant out of many participants may abort the protocol at every time, and must not get an information advantage out of this behavior compared to other participants. (Kissner and Song, ) proposes a set intersection algorithm for malicious parties, but does neither tackle the problem that participants can take the "whole world" as customers in order to get knowledge the other participants complete database, nor gives experimental results for the algorithm.
When databases are used to store enterprise information, multiparty computation often relates to special database functions (Agrawal et al., 2003; Clifton et al., 2003) . A secure computation of the joinoperator, for instance, is discussed in (Agrawal et al., 2003) . This solution, proposed for n = 2 parties, also uses commutative encryption, but reveals the data to one party only since it assumes an "semi-honest" behavior (Goldreich, 2000) , which means that although a party might analyze messages, it will not alter the protocol execution. If we take participants that cheat into consideration, and would try to adapt our idea of a pair-wise exchange of intersecting tuples to (Agrawal et al., 2003) , participants still may cheat, as explained in the following: In the first step, N 1 receives C 1 P 2 (notation defined as in Definition 3.9), N 2 SECRYPT 2007 -International Conference on Security and Cryptography
. Then both parties encrypt the data a second time, and determine the common tuples. The first party N 1 decrypts the first common tuple and sends it as h to N 2 . However, N 2 has no evidence that the decrypted data is really in the intersection. N 1 may have cheated and have sent an arbitrary item of C 1 P 2 to N 2 . N 2 would wrongly assume that this item is in the intersection, decrypt it with its key and send the hash value back to N 1 . In this case, N 1 does not only know the hash value but also whether the associated data is really in the intersection. Furthermore, N 1 can store the hash value in order to check if future customers are also in the database of N 2 . The crux of adapting this approach to a step-by-step exchange is that N 2 has no means to determine if N 1 plays fair.
In contrast, our solution is suitable for an arbitrary number of participants and is not restricted to n = 2 like our previous contribution (Böttcher and Obermeier, 2006) , and focuses on a model where each of the n participants may act malicious and may not only stop the protocol execution, but may also change messages or fake data. We introduce the term information unit and show that no secure exchange protocol exists that can guarantee an atomic exchange of a single information unit. Furthermore, we add an additional verification phase, which will detect any cheating of a participant.
Since we reveal the decrypted information units of the intersection step by step, proposals for guaranteeing a fair data exchange are also relevant. Some of these proposals rely on a trusted third party (Ajmani et al., 2001; Jefferies et al., 1995) , while other proposals do not necessarily need this third party. (Asokan et al., 1997; Asokan et al., 1998) , for example, describe an approach for a fair exchange of items by using a third party only if participants cheat. If a third party is present but not trustable, (Franklin and Reiter, 1997) shows an approach to use this third party for fair data exchange. (Asokan et al., 1997) classifies the type of the exchanged items, and claims to guarantee an atomic exchange for items belonging to the categories revocable or generatable. However, since enterprise information is in many cases neither revocable nor generatable, the approach to use a third party for collecting affidavits and starting law suits in case of malicious participants is suitable for goods and items, but cannot be used to revoke the reveal of sensible enterprise data. In contrast, our approach does not rely on a certain item category; it is useful for non-revocable and non-generatable items as well.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this contribution, we have presented an application scenario where multiple parties need a secure exchange of common information, although they do not trust each other and assume malicious behavior. We have shown that atomicity for the exchange of the common data is not possible if no trusted third party is used for this purpose. Furthermore, we have proposed a solution, which reduces the damage that each party suffers in case that another party alters the exchange protocol to the disclosure of one additional independent information unit. We have shown experimental results on the trade-off "trust vs. exchange speed", and demonstrated that even in an environment with high message latency our protocol is still feasible.
In the future, we plan to investigate a secure and secret processing of arbitrary database algebra expressions.
